Last month, we began a series called “Exchanges,” which invites authors to debate each other on a particular question. The first “Exchanges” post featured an essay by Daniel A. Bell and response from Michael Walzer on the topic of “Reconciling Confucianism and Socialism.” We also asked readers to submit their own thoughts on the subject, and received the commentary below from Peter Vernezze (which was also published at China From Afar). Bell, in turn, has written a reply to Vernezze’s critique.
By Peter Vernezze
In search of “a new moral foundation for political rule in China” because “communism has lost its capacity to inspire the Chinese,” Professor Bell asks whether Confucianism can step up and take this role. Not, according to Bell, if we stick to a traditional “conservative” or “official” Confucianism, which can simply be used to prioritize such values as “filial piety” and “harmony” as a way “to justify quietude and submission to the powers-that-be.” Bell as well rejects a classical liberal version of Confucianism because it tends to read the Confucian tradition through the lens of liberalism and not take Confucianism seriously in its own right. Instead, Bell advocates for what he calls a “left Confucianism” that draws on the socialist tradition for inspiration. There are six main tenets to his “leftist Confucianism”:
1. Independent social and political criticism
2. Concern for the disadvantaged
3. Concern for basic material well-being
4. Solidarity with strangers
5. Global justice
6. Religious toleration
My problem is not that these are not six desirable tenets. Rather, the difficulty I have is that it is hard to see how any of these can be said to meaningfully follow from Confucianism. And, if no meaningful line can be drawn between Confucianism and the six tenets that Bell offers, then the extent to which the theory can be called Confucian must be called into question.
To begin, Bell sees the Analects’ claim that exemplary persons should pursue harmony but not conformity as serving as the basis in Confucianism for his first tenet, a belief in the value of independent social and political criticism. A Confucian political criticism, he adds, would be far more restrained than we understand it in the West. It would be “carried out on the basis of social harmony and trust” as well as “motivated by affection rather than hostility and expressed in gentle and humble ways.” For left Confucianists, the media would be part of the mechanism of social criticism, but “[an important task of the] media should also be to promote social harmony by portraying moral exemplars.” Harmony, however, is much too abstract a concept to serve as a ground for meaningful social criticism. Indeed, one cannot imagine the most repressive social measure that could not be justified because it serves the goal of harmony. Indeed, most of them use precisely this justification. As such, a mere expressed preference for harmony over conformity would hardly seem to open the door for any meaningful social criticism.
The second tenet in Bell’s leftist Confucianism is an obligation is to provide for the disadvantaged. However, Bell offers no text on this point except Mencius’s that “the government should give first consideration to ‘old men without wives, old women without husbands, old people without children, and young children without fathers.’” That this is the one Confucian text he cites demonstrates the lack of connection between this virtue and Confucianism, since the groups cited cannot be considered “disadvantaged” in a meaningful sense of the word without massively equivocating. The problem is that there is not the ground in the Analects for an obligation among citizens —not one of the five relationships mentioned in the Analects involves this relation — and hence, no obligation to care for disadvantaged citizens.
The third element of Bell’s leftist Confucianism is a concern for basic material well-being. Bell does not even follow the example in the previous point and offer a lame passage. He offers no text within the Confucian corpus to support this point. Instead he argues that “Confucians would choose economic equality and make social inequality work to support it.” Since the statement is not supported by any evidence in Bell’s article, it does not need to be refuted by any.
The fourth trait of leftist Confucianism is solidarity with strangers. Here, at last, Bell offers up a Confucian text and tries to connect it with the trait in question. Unfortunately, the argument is unpersuasive. Bell cites a claim from the famous opening passage of The Great Learning: “…when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there is peace throughout the world.” Bell wants to argue that “the idea is that ties should be extended from the family to the state and ultimately to the whole world.” However, the text does not say that taking care of family will lead to a concern for strangers, which is what Bell’s thesis requires. It simply says that when the family is taken care of, then the state will be in order. This implies no more than that the family being regulated is a sufficient condition of the state being well-ordered. It does not imply a concern for anyone outside of the family is necessary for the state to be well-ordered. For much the same reason it seems unlikely that a concern for “global justice,” Bell’s fifth trait of leftist Confucianism, can be linked to that philosophical system.
The sixth and final aspect of Bell’s leftist Confucianism is religious toleration. He does not so much offer a positive argument as to why leftist Confucianism would tolerate other religions as a negative one. “Left Confucians do not take a strong position regarding religion. Following the example of the early Confucian thinkers, they leave metaphysical commitments open, focusing on the problems of earthly.” But a concern for the earthly does not in itself assure that Confucianism will lean towards religious toleration. Indeed, if a concern for the social good were part of a Confucian ideal than a religious view that presented an alternate social good would hardly be tolerated: witness Han Yu’s attack on Buddhism.
In conclusion, while I admire Professor Bell’s effort, I fear thinkers will have to look elsewhere than Confucianism to find a philosophical system compatible with a leftist/liberal ideology.
Response by Daniel A. Bell
I am grateful for the thoughtful response to my article. Let me try to clarify my intentions, which may help to dispel areas of disagreement. I agree that the six tenets do not follow from Confucianism. But that’s not my argument. My strategy in the article is to take six widely-agreed upon humane and progressive values and to think about how they might have particular characteristics if they are interpreted via a Confucian moral framework.
Let me address some of the points made about the particular values. Again, I agree with much that is said. For example, I agree that harmony is “much too abstract a concept to serve as a ground for social criticism.” But it can serve as a ground for social criticism if we try to understand what Confucians mean by the harmony. The line from the Analects that exemplary persons pursue harmony instead of conformity is known to most educated Chinese. And the contrast between harmony and conformity, as mentioned in the article, comes from the Zuo Zhuan, where it clearly refers to the idea that the ruler should be open to different political views. Yes, the term harmony can be misused by political authorities to justify political conformity, just as any other idea can be misused (think of all the damage done in the name of promoting freedom and democracy). All Confucian social critics can do is point to the gap between the ideal and the reality.
Regarding the second value. I agree that the Analects does not focus on the relation between citizen and citizen. But it doesn’t follow that Confucians cannot think about the question of what the government should do for the people and the different kinds of obligations owed to different kinds of people. Mencius argues that the government should give first consideration to those deprived of key family ties, and I think that’s a distinctive and morally defensible way of thinking about our obligations to the disadvantaged.
Anyway, if the concern is to provide more references to the Confucian sources that inspired the arguments of this paper, let me immodestly refer to my books China’s New Confucianism and Beyond Liberal Democracy, where I develop these ideas in greater depth. Having said that, it might not be so important to go through each tenet to “prove” that I’m putting forward a Confucian viewpoint; it might be more fruitful to ask whether the viewpoints put forward in the article are worth defending in contemporary China. I do believe they are inspired by the Confucian tradition – I would not have come up with these ideas had I not studied and learned from the rich and diverse Confucian tradition – but at the end of the day the label used to describe those ideas may not be so crucial. If they are implemented under a different label I would not lose any sleep.
Tags: Confucianism